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DEVELOPMENT AND STRucruRx OF THE REGULATION
A. Introduction
Direct price controls under OPS really began when the General Ceiling Price
Regulation (GCPR) was issued on January 26, I951. Although described'as an
interim regulation, the GCPR remained in effect for many sellers and commodities
throughout the entire period of price control from January 1951 to March 1953. In
this respect, it paralleled the history of its predecessor under the Office of Price Ad-
ministration during World War II, the General Maximum Price Regulation (GMPR
or General Max), after which it was largely patterned.
Each of these two general price freeze regulations was issued after an initial
period in which reliance was placed mainly on voluntary or selective techniques of
price control, and only after the stabilization agencies became convinced that such
voluntary or selective methods would not work Based on past experience, it
seems reasonable to expect that, in a future general emergency calling for the im-
position of direct price controls, a general price freeze will be utilized again.
The purposes of this study are to describe the origin and development of some
of the major provisions of the GCPR and to analyze and discuss some of the
problems not apparent from a mere reading of the regulatory provisions themselves,
and in doing so to set down some comments and suggestions which might be of
value in connection with the use of a general freeze in the future.
The factors that led to the use of other methods of price control for many things
originally covered by the general freeze, are beyond the scope of this study. Under
both OPA and OPS, a general freeze was viewed primarily as a comprehensive stop-
gap measure, and secondarily as a continuing mechanism for miscellaneous items.
Some of these were not sufficiently important or troublesome to require specific reg-
ulations; for others, the freeze was as good a technique of control as any other.
"lThe opinions herein expressed are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the position of any
past or present Government agency.
*A.B. 1931, Cornell University; LL.B. 1933, Columbia University Law School. Attorney with Sc-
curities and Exchange Commission. Formerly Associate Chief Counsel, Office of Price Stabilization,
and Assistant General Counsel, Office of Price Administration. Author, Price-Supply Problems in
Building Materials, chapter ig in PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL: CHANGING PRODUCTIo PAmTTRNS, GEN.
PuB. No. 9, OPA Hisromet L REPoRTs ON WAR ADnmasrSRAToN 293-357 (1947). Contributor of
articles to Columbia Law Review.
1 s6 FED. REG. 8o8 (1951).
2 However, prior to the issuance of the GMPP OPA had issued more than one hundred specific
regulations, whereas OPS had issued only two prior to the GCPR, one of them issued only the day
before.
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The major defects of a general freeze appear when it is viewed as a long-run
comprehensive control method. Any attempt to analyze the inherent limitations
that made it desirable to replace the general freeze in particular cases would encom-
pass the whole range of problems and activities of the price stabilization program.
This study, then, is more in the nature of an exposition of the technical problems
of a general price freeze, using the actual experience under the GCPR as the vehicle.
It, therefore, seeks to discuss only the regulatory and interpretative problems to be
faced once those in policy-making positions have decided upon a general price
freeze.
While some problems cannot be known in advance of the actual occasion for the
imposition of a freeze, many aspects of a general price freeze would be much the
same under almost any circumstances, and were much the same during the time of
both OPA and OPS. A description of the provisions of the GCPR, and an analysis
of some of the most vexing problems, therefore, can be useful for the future.
The basic framework of the GCPR, like that of the GMPR, is fairly well known.
In brief, the general freeze covered most sales of commodities and services, and
fixed each individual seller's ceilings at the highest prices he himself charged during
a preceding base period. The primary and immediate purpose of the general freeze
was to stop the upward thrust of all price movements, and to give the stabilization
agency time to issue tailored regulations for specific industries.
The freeze technique catches business and prices as of a specific period in time.
But the business conditions themselves do not remain frozen. A "pure" freeze
does not provide for people not in business, or for commodities not sold, during
the base period. So other methods in addition to the pure freeze had to be devised
to take care of the problems of new goods and new sellers. These included the
techniques of formula, comparison, and competitive pricing, and each raised its own
series of complex administrative and interpretative problems.
In addition, the GCPR was not literally and completely a "general" freeze.
It covered most, but not all sales of commodities and services. Some of the ex-
ceptions were based on statutory exemptions or limitations, others on grounds of
administrative difficulties, and others on overriding considerations such as the needs
of the defense program.
The advantage of a general freeze is that it can be issued quickly to cover im-
mediately a wide area. A large staff is not essential to its issuance, since it is based
primarily on existing prices and practices, and requires a minimum of factual in-
vestigation and information. By the same token, the very comprehensiveness of a
general freeze would require a large staff either to administer it if it is to remain
in effect for any significant period of time as a continuing mechanism of control,
or to replace it with more specific regulations under a continuing program of price
control. An adequate staff is necessary to authorize exceptions and adjustments to
avoid serious hardship, impairment of the defense program, or general disregard of
the regulation.
The effects of a general freeze on some individual sellers or industries might
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become intolerable even over a short period of 6o or 90 days. On the other hand,
many problems, even though serious to the persons involved, can be "lived with"
for a short time, if there is some assurance that help is on the way. For the short
term, therefore, a general freeze need not "fit" perfectly for everybody-this, as
already indicated, both facilitates its issuance and complicates its administration or
replacement.
Even for the short term, however, the specific provisions of a general freeze may
serve to ease the administrative burdens. Some of the later refinements of the
GCPR, if included at the outset in any future general freeze, might eliminate some
of the pressure on the administrative staff. This would leave the staff to that
extent freer to cope with the many problems that cannot be eliminated except by the
issuance of specific regulations to replace the freeze.
For example, a more liberal exemption policy for small business, for insignificant
items difficult to control, and for other situations where exemptions would have no
real impact on the stabilization program, and the earlier use of "built-in" adjust-
ment provisions (like the one permitting the use of price lists where some-but not
all-of the items had been sold at the list prices during the base period) would have
made it unnecessary for large numbers of sellers to come to OPS for information or
relief. At the same time, the resulting "relaxation" would not have been expensive
to the stabilization program, certainly not in relation to the time and effort required
to listen to, much less answer, the complaints and pleas otherwise encountered.
B. Selection of the Base Period
The GCPR, issued on January 26, I951, established ceilings on the basis of prices
in effect during the base period of December 19, i95o to January 25, i95i, inclusive.
The GMPR, issued by OPA on April 28, 1942, used the month of March x942 as a
base period.
Both freezes used base periods later than those mentioned in the respective
statutes. The Emergency Price Control Act of 19422 directed that so far as prac-
ticable consideration be given, among other things, to the prices prevailing between
October i and October 15, 1941. Similarly, the Defense Production Act of 19501b
referred to prices prevailing May 24, i95o to June 24, i95o, inclusive, the month prior
to the Korean invasion.
Selection of a base period posed three main questions: (i) How far back should
the base period be set-in other words, how much of a rollback of prices, if any,
should be required; (2) how long should the base period be-a day, week, month,
or longer; and (3) should there be a uniform base period for all sellers or staggered
base periods for different groups or levels?
The Defense Production Act itself contained no provision regarding a base
period for a freeze, other than the direction that so far as practicable consideration
be given, among other things, to the level of prices prevailing May 24 to June 24,
1950.
-s56 STA. 23, 24 (1942), as amended, 5o U. S. C. App. §§90i, 902(a) (1946).
"b 6 4 STArT. 798, 803 (195o), as amended, 5o U. S. C. App. §§2o6r, 2102(b)(c) (Supp. 1952 ) .
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In January 1951, a rollback to the prices in effect during the period May 24 to
June 24, 1950 seemed clearly out of the question. The situation was complicated,
however, by the fact that the Economic Stabilization Agency's public announce-
ment on December 19, 195o of its Voluntary Pricing Standards included the follow-
ing sentence:
The Agency served notice upon all sellers affected by the standards that any official
price action hereafter taken will make use of a base period ending not later than De-
cember I, 1950, and that no seller will derive any advantage under the regulations from
price increases after that date.
The longer the issuance of a general freeze was delayed, the more difficult it was
to restore pre-December 195o prices. In late January 1951, a rollback to December
1, 1950 price levels would have meant approximately a two-month rollback, as com-
pared with just under a month by OPA. There were strong practical arguments
against such a rollback. It was not possible to roll back wages, representing an
important element of business costs, and, of course, under the Defense Production
Act the imposition of wage controls was tied to price controls. Neither could the
prices of many imported commodities, some of which represented important costs
to domestic manufacturers and processors, be rolled back. Furthermore, farm
products generally were below the statutory minimum prices, and OPS was legally
unable even to fix ceilings on many agricultural commodities, much less roll back
their prices.
It was reluctantly concluded that any significant rollback was not feasible. Re-
luctantly, for two reasons: First, the decision meant that the freeze would catch
prices at a higher level during a period in which cost-price relationships were more
distorted; second, it appeared to be a breach of faith with those who had relied
on the statement that no seller would derive any advantage under price regulations
from price increases made after December I, 195o.
OPS believed that any base period would provide serious problems, but that
one as near in time as possible to the date of the freeze would provide the fewest
administrative difficulties.3 The Statement of Considerations for the GCPR recog-
nized the practical considerations, and sought to mollify the reaction to the current
freeze by stating that in the future the price-cost structures in the various industries
would be examined to determine where changes in existing prices were appropriate.
It had been proposed that the base period end on January 19, 1951, to avoid
legalizing price increases after that date in anticipation of the freeze. A modest
rollback of this kind to cut off last minute price increases seemed both feasible and
desirable. The proposal was rejected, however, in part because of the opposition to
any rollback, and in part because of the decision to make the freeze effective im-
mediately upon issuance on January 26, i95i. 4 Had the original plan to make the
'Memorandum from Michael V. DiSalle to Eric Johnston, Jan. 2o, i95i. This had also been the
OPA view. See the Statement of Considerations for the GMPR.
"For a more detailed discussion of the events leading up to the decision to use a current base period
and make the regulation effective immediately, see GAmRNER ACKaEY, SELECTED PROBLEMS OF PRICE
CONTROL STRATEGY, 1950-1952 (unpublished OPS study) c. 2.
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freeze effective two weeks after issuance been followed, sellers would have had time
to adjust their prices under a rollback; to make a rollback effective immediately
would undoubtedly have caused numerous sellers to be in violation of the regu-
lation.5
The length of the base period was not as controversial as the question of a roll-
back. OPA had used a calendar month as the base period. OPS used a period of
approximately five weeks. Generally, in both instances, the objective was to select
the shortest period that would catch representative transactions for the bulk of the
volume of sales.' For such a comprehensive regulation as the GCPR or the GMPR,
it was felt that a base period of at least one month was required to achieve this
objective.
If a base period is made too short, it is not likely to cover enough sales to be
representative, especially for items with a long production period. If a long base
period is used, more sellers are covered, but then there is the danger that going
back too far will freeze many sellers at out-of-line prices.7
When the same base period is used for all sellers, inequities may result from the
fact that some sellers have not had or used the opportunity to raise prices as fast
as others. A uniform base period thus could freeze many sellers' costs at a high
level and their selling prices at a lower level. For this reason, both in OPA and
OPS the use of staggered base periods was considered, but eventually rejected because
of the complexity of the problems involved.
Inequities resulting from the use of a uniform base period could be most
serious at the distributive levels. In many industries, price increases at the manu-
facturing level normally would be reflected sometime later at the wholesale level,
and yet later at the retail level. But this was not uniformly so, and also the period
before the imposition of the freeze was not a normal period in the usual sense.
The use of staggered base periods would have required a determination of what
were reasonable lags for wholesalers or retailers. Furthermore, many manufacturers'
prices also lagged behind increases in their costs. OPS concluded that the use of
one base period for all sellers, with a recognition that inequities existed which
would be adjusted as soon as they could be identified, would be easier to justify
than the use of questionable time lags from the start.'
The Statement of Considerations for the GCPR also cast some doubt on the
seriousness of the lag problem?°
'Under OPA, the GMPR became effective for manufacturers on May xx, 1942, two weeks after
issuance, and for retailers on May i8, 1942, three weeks after issuance.
aFor OPA practice, see Dickerson, The Industry Earnings Standard, in PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL:
PRICING STANDARDS, GEN. PUB. No. 7, OPA HISTORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION 27, at 69
(1947).
'For example, if a base period of six months were used, and a seller's only sale of a particular com-
modity came on the first day of that period, he would be frozen to that six months' old price. In the
same situation but with a one-month base period, his price for that particular commodity would be
fixed in line with prices charged for other commodities in the one-month period.8 Memorandum of Jan. 20, i951, from Michael V. DiSalle to Eric Johnston.
In reaching this conclusion, OPS may have been influenced by the feeling that the OPA experience
with GMPR indicated the importance of the squeeze problem was probably overestimated. See Hart,
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The base period selected is uniform for all sellers covered by this regulation. Normally,
there is a lag between a change in prices at one level and a corresponding change in
prices at the next level of production and distribution. The degree of the lag usually
depends on the rapidity with which merchandise is turned over and on the state of the
markets. But these are certainly not normal times. The speed with which prices have
been rising over the whole economy indicates that most sellers have been keeping pace
with, and in many cases anticipating, the rise in costs.
Undoubtedly the selection of the base period may minimize or complicate the
administrative problems of a general freeze. Yet attempts to minimize the ad-
ministrative problems by selecting an earlier base period to freeze a lower level of
prices and a better price relationship, or by using staggered base periods for the
different levels of production and distribution, might have created worse admin-
istrative problems than those sought to be thus avoided.10
Although failure to provide for a rollback in setting the base period for the
GCPR has been criticized as a mistake, the substance of that criticism is really di-
rected at the failure to issue the regulation earlier. Failure to act earlier admittedly
posed seriotis problems in the administration of the stabilization program. But
having failed to act earlier, it is doubtful if the Government could have simplified
those problems by seeking to turn back the clock to pre-December 1950 prices."
The major lesson seems to be that it is better and easier to catch the price struc-
ture at a reasonable stage before it gets out of hand, rather than to let it get out
of hand and then seek to restore it to some prior "normalcy." Congressional and
business sentiments were much stronger against rollbacks than they were against
an earlier imposition of a freeze. OPS's subsequent unhappy experience with roll-
back attempts was evidence of this although it must be recognized, of course, that
the earlier a rollback is attempted the greater are its chances of success.
The General Maximum Price Regulation, in PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL; PRIcm TEcImQuEs, GEN.
PUB. No. 8, OPA HisToRIcAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMnNISrr.AToN I, 12 (1947).
"°It is interesting to note the base period provisions in S. io8a and H. R. 3184, 83rd Cong., st
Sess. (1953), bills introduced in February, 1953, by Senator Capehart and Representatve Multer, re-
spectively, to give the President standby authority to issue a 9o-day freeze in an emergency. The Cape-
hart bill, as passed by the Senate on May 19, 1953, authorized the establishment of ceilings on prices
"at those prevailing as of the close of business on the business day next preceding the day on which
the action is taken, or those prevailing on the nearest date during the preceding thirty days on which,
in the judgment of the President, they are generally representative, or if none prevailed during such
thirty day period, then those prevailing on the nearest date on which, in the judgment of the President,
they are generally representative." The Multer bill authorized a freeze as of a "base date or dates, or
base period, not more than one month prior to such order."
Both bills thus seemed to prohibit a rollback of more than a month. S. 753, a bill introduced earlier
in February, 1953, by Senator Capehart to give the President general standby authority for economic
controls, seemed (Sec. 402) to prohibit any freeze rollback by requiring that the initial fixing of ceilings
be "at the level prevailing as of the close of business on the business day next preceding the day on which
the action is taken."
"XThe General Manufacturers' Regulation, CPR 22, 16 Fan. REG. 3562 (595i), only attempted to
restore approximately the price levels of Dec. 31, 195o. But while CPR 22 provided that pre-Korean
prices could be increased to reflect increases in cost of many manufacturing materials only up to Dec.
3r, 1950, many other raw materials cost increases were allowed up to March 15, 1951. Furthermore,
cost increases for farm commodities below parity were allowed up to any current date. And for labor,
cost increases could also be computed up to March 15, x951. These provisions recognized the im-
practicability of rolling back prices in certain areas of the economy.
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A modest rollback period, of approximately two to three weeks, undoubtedly
would have been feasible, and would have minimized to some extent the distortions
otherwise frozen into the price structure. Whether it would have made enough
difference to have had a significant effect on the stabilization program is prob-
lematical. It would have required postponement of the effective date of the freeze
for at least two weeks, and after having delayed so long, the stabilization agencies
were anxious to make the freeze effective immediately and avoid possible confusion
and uncertainty during a waiting period.
In retrospect, the use of a uniform current base period seems justified, certainly
in the light of the objective of speedy and comprehensive control at one stroke.
The lag in distributors' prices and other problems, could be, and were, met later by
the issuance of specific regulations tailored for such problems.
C. Coverage
The Statement of Considerations for the GCPR stated:
The purpose of the accompanying general regulation is to hold prices on a broad
front. Accordingly, it covers the widest possible range of commodities and sellers.
Manufactures, wholesalers and retailers together with suppliers of services come within
its terms. The intention has been to include within its scope all sellers of all commodities
and services except to the extent that legal or strong practical reasons require that par-
ticular sellers or types of commodities be exempt.
The basic approach, dictated by the very concept of a "general" freeze, was that
everything and everyone was covered, unless specifically excluded. Notwithstanding
general agreement as to the approach on coverage, many problems, some of a tech-
nical nature, existed with respect to the definitions of commodities, services, persons,
sales, the list of exemptions, the treatment of imported commodities, etc. These
will be discussed below.
i. Definition of Commodities and Services. The GCPR defined commodities,
in Section 22, as including "commodities, materials, articles, products, supplies, com-
ponents processes... -2 This was almost verbatim the definition of "materials"
in Section 702(b) of the Defense Production Act (50 U. S. C. App. §2152(b) (Supp.
1952)).
The general term "commodities" was more a part of the folklore of OPS, as it
was of OPA, than "materials." There is no evidence that the use of "materials"
in the Defense Production Act was intended to have a different result than the use of
"commodity" in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. In fact, it was clear
that "materials" was intended to be at least as comprehensive as "commodity" was
under the Emergency Price Control Act; materials as defined in the Defense Pro-
duction Act included "commodities."' 3
"-The definition originally also included "and contracts to buy, sell or deliver any of the fore-
going." These words, which also appeared in the definition of commodity in the GMPR, are not really
necessary to the definition, and caused some persons to claim different ceilings for contracts as against
deliveries. For this reason, they were deleted by Amendment 2 to the GCPR, 16 Fed. Reg. x789 (195).
" "Commodity" as defined in Sec. 302(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 also included
"materials."
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Just as the definition of commodities was intended to include every tangible
object not specifically excluded, so the definition of service was intended to include
every opqration or function other than that of an employee.14 Thus fees or charges
for the granting of a privilege, fotr forbearance to act, and for rentals of commodities
or services were subject to the regulation as prices for services.
The GCPR covered many services not subject to regulation by OPA. The
Emergency Price Control Act had applied only to services supplied in connection
with a commodity.' 5 This restriction did not appear in the Defense Production Act.
Thus the Defense Production Act and the GCPR applied to many personal services
unrelated to commodities, as for example, most banking services.16
The GCPR became effective immediately for services as well as commodities.
Under the GMPR, issued April 28, 1942, the prohibition and maximum price pro-
visions did not apply to sales of services at retail until July i, 1942, and prior to
that date, OPA issued a special regulation for services.' 7
OPS as soon as practicable also issued a specific regulation replacing the GCPR
for most services.' But while OPA had in effect exempted retail services pending
the preparation of a services regulation, OPS covered services generally under the
general freeze while it was readying its services regulation.
Recognizing that a general freeze cannot adequately meet the special needs of
numerous suppliers of services, just as it cannot adequately meet the special needs
of other industry groups, the purposes of a general freeze are better served by
covering services for the short term while a specific regulation is being drafted, as
OPS did, than by exempting them as OPA did. If retail sellers of services are to be
exempt from a general freeze until a specific regulation can be worked out for them,
why not retail sellers of commodities, or other special areas? This approach, car-
ried far enough, turns a "general" freeze into a technique of selective controls, thus
frustrating the very purpose of the general freeze-to cover quickly the broad front
of commodities and services.
2. Persons and Transactions Covered. The regulation not only prohibited sales
at prices exceeding the ceiling prices, but also prohibited any person from buying in
the regular course of business or trade at a price higher than ceiling. The regula-
tion defined "person" in the terms of Section 7o2(a )of the Act (50 U. S. C. App.
" Wages and salaries, while subject to control under the Defense Production Act, were under the
jurisdiction of the Wage and Salary Stabilization Boards, and so were excluded from price regulations.
The definition of service in the GCPR also originally included a reference to contracts to sell or
supply services. This was deleted by Amendment 2 to the GCPR, for the same reason as applied
to the deletion of a similar reference to contracts in the definition of commodities.
"Actually, Sec. 302(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 defined commodity as in-
cluding services rendered otherwise than as an employee in connection with the processing, distribution,
storage, installation, repair or negotiation of sales of a commodity.
" One banking service that was subject to control under OPA was the rental of safe deposit boxes.
It was held that the definition of commodity under the Emergency Price Control Act included the
storage of jewelry and securities, and that this constituted a service in connection with the storage of
commodities. See Lincoln Savings Bank v. Brown, 137 F. ad 228 (E.C.A. 1943).
"Maximum Price Regulation 165, 7 FED. REG. 4734 (942).
"8 CPR 34, 16 FED. REe. 4446 (1951).
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§2152(a) (Supp. 1952)) to include an "individual, corporation, partnership, associa-
tion, or any other organized group of persons, or legal successors or representative
of the foregoing, and includes the United States or any agency thereof, or any other
government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any agency of any of the fore-
going."
Section 405 of the Defense Production Act (50 U. S. C. App. §2Io5(a) (Supp.
1952)) made buyers' over-ceiling payments unlawful only when the buyer was buy-
ing or receiving any commodity or service in the regular course of business or trade."0
A purchase in the regular course of business or trade included one by an industrial,
commercial or governmental consumer, or by a person in the business of buying for
resale, but did not include purchases by individual ultimate consumers for their
own or family use. Sellers, however, were subject to ceiling price restrictions
whether or not their sales were made in the regular course of business or trade.20
Under the definition of person, the separate identity of a corporation was pre-
served, and transactions between corporations were subject to the ceiling price re-
strictions even when between affiliated corporations. In the absence of specific
regulatory provisions, different corporate entities were regarded as different sellers
except where necessary to prevent fraud.2 Although undoubtedly some transactions
between affiliated companies might, have been treated as bookeeping transactions
similar to transactions between two divisions of one company, neither time nor
staff permitted an examination of transactions of this kind to determine when an
exemption from the general freeze would have been justified and when it would
have been subject to abuses. In later months, it was possible to give attention to
specific situations and to determine that no harm to the stabilization program would
come if some inter-corporate transactions were exempt.
For example, sales of iron ore, bauxite, pulpwood, and tobacco between affiliated
corporations were exempted by later actions.22 The statements of considerations in-
dicated that although the affiliated corporations were technically separate persons
under the definition in the GCPR, transactions between the affiliates in these cases
were really similar to transfers betweens divisions or units of the same business.
It is significant that these transactions involved raw materials, and it was found
that the exemption of sales between affiliates would not affect ceilings on the finished
products. A general exemption of transactions between affiliated corporations, how-
ever, would not seem desirable, and certainly not as a part of a general freeze.
The GCPR in general cut across pre-existing contracts, by making the prohibitions
against over-ceiling transactions apply "regardless of any contract or other obliga-
"0A similar restriction appeared in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Sec. 4(a). The Cape-
hart and Multer bills to give the President standby authority to impose a 9o-day freeze also contained
similar limitations (S. io8i and H. R. 3184, 83rd Cong., ist Sess. (1953)).2
' Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg 11:202.1.
"Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg II:222.41.
"Amendment 16 to GOR 9, 17 FED. REaG. 3648 (I952); Amendment 3o to GOR 9, x8 FED. Rao.
227 (x953); Amendment 8 to GOR 8, 18 FED. REG. 824 (1953); Supplementary Regulations ix9 to the
GCPR, 17 FaD. Ra. 8346 (1952).
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tion." A similar provision had been included by OPA in the GMPR and had been
held valid by the courts.23
Authority to cut across pre-existing contracts was contained in Section 4 o2(d) (x)
of the Defense Production Act of 195 o (50 U. S. C. App. §2o2(d) (i) (Supp. 1952)),
which read:
Regulations and orders issued under this title shall apply regardless of any obligation
heretofore or hereafter incurred except as provided in this subsection; but the President
shall make appropriate provision to prevent hardships and inequities to sellers who have
bona fide contracts in effect on the date of issuance of any such regulation or order for
future delivery of materials in which seasonal demands or normal business practices re-
quire contracts for future delivery.
The GCPR made no provision for existing contracts to prevent hardship, because
it was impossible to identify in advance the specific types of hardship situations which
a general freeze might create and which would qualify for relief under this Section
of the Act
4
Section xo(c) of the regulation did, however, permit importers of strategic ma-
terials to pass on price increases for imported goods received after January 26, 1951,
pursuant to contracts entered into on or before that date. The purpose of this was
to maintain essential supply, as well as to avoid the damage to our relations with
friendly nations that would have resulted if importers canceled bona fide contracts.
Once deliveries on existing contracts were disposed of, the importer's ceiling price
reverted to the base level.
Soon after the issuance of the GCPR, a somewhat similar dispensation was given
exporters, who were permitted to fulfill written contracts for export sales executed,
or based upon firm.written orders made, prior to January 26, 19i.25 The ex-
porters were required, however, to observe the domestic ceilings on their purchases.
As justification for this action, it was stated that there is an extra time lag in the
case of exports between the contract date and the date of delivery, because of the
special factors applicable to export sales, special packing, shipping arrangements,
license clearances, etc. Second, it was felt that the failure to fulfill contracts for
export -might have a detrimental effect on foreign trade, business reputation for
honoring contracts, and foreign relations generally. Also, the relief thus granted
exporters would not generally have any inflationary impact in the United States.
Any general exception of existing contracts would be inconsistent with the
"Seminole Rock and Sand Co. v. Fleming, 17o F. 2d 542 (E.C.A. 1947).
The general problems relating to adjustments under the freeze, to relieve hardship and for
other purposes, are discussed in another study. Sec. 4(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
the statutory authority for the provision in the GMPK cutting across existing contracts, did not require any
special provision to prevent hardship for sellers who had contracts in effect when the regulation was
issued. Nor did the Capehart and Multer bills to give the President standby authority to impose a,
9o-day freeze (S. io8S and H. R. 3184, 83rd Cong., ist Sess. (1953)) limit the authority to cut across
existing contracts.
" SR 9 to the GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 2o63 (g5i). Originally this was limited to merchant exporters
who bought commodities for resale to foreign buyers. A revision, 16 Fan. REG. 4194 (i95i), extended
the application of the regulation to cover producer exporters as well.
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purposes and effectiveness of a general freeze. After a general freeze is issued, it
may be possible and desirable, on analysis of specific situations, to authorize the
carrying out of some pre-existing contracts. For example, at a later date, OPS per-
mitted sellers of chemicals and certain other commodities under long-term contracts
made prior to price control to apply for permission to carry out those contracts, even
though this resulted in prices higher than the base period prices.
20
3. Geographical Application and Treatment of Exports and Imports. The
GCPR, like the GMPR, applied in the continental United States (the 48 states and
the District of Columbia) and also to the territories and possessions. Nevertheless,
it was recognized that the same freeze could not be long maintained for both the
mainland and the territories because of the time lag between increases in mainland
costs and their reflection in prices in the territories.2"
But even before the GCPR was replaced in the territories generally, special
action was taken to exempt the Panama Canal Zone from price regulation.2 8 The
United States Government in effect had a monopoly on the supply of goods to the
armed forces and other residents there, and prices were kept purposely low. Under
these circumstances the indirect control established by ceilings on supplies in the
United States was considered sufficient.
Exporters and importers also were initially covered by the GCPR. Especially
in the case of importers, however, it was clear that the general freeze would soon
be replaced by a specific regulation. Obviously, long-term price policies for im-
ported commodities would have to be based on different considerations than those
applicable to domestic goods. The freeze itself applied only to prices charged in
this country. The United States, of course, had no direct control over prices charged
by foreign sellers outside this country,2" so that the GCPR in effect froze importers'
prices without freezing their costs.
A special regulation for importers and imported commodities was issued in May
i95i.3°  Later, a specific regulation for exporters was also issued."' The export
problems were not so urgent because exporters' costs were more subject to control
and because Section io(a) of the GCPR in effect permitted exporters to maintain
their customary differentials between prices on domestic sales and prices on export
sales.
Although special factors involving foreign trade and foreign relations existed in
connection with both exporters and importers, it was found necessary to have
price controls on both kinds of sellers if the effectiveness of a general freeze was
'GOR 27, I7 FED. REG. 2923 (1952); Amendments 2 and 3, 17 FED. REG. 8628, xs646 (1952).
" CPR 9, 16 FED. REG. 2183 (i95i), replaced the GCPR for all commodities sold in the territories
and possessions but not manufactured there.
"
8 SR 6 to the GCPR, 16 FED. MFG. 1791 ('95').
9 The United States could not impose legal ceilings on the prices foreign sellers charged on sales
consummated abroad, although this country could prohibit importers from paying foreign sellers prices
higher than those consistent with domestic ceilings. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Porter, 156
F. 2d 812 (E. C. A. 1946). But while the United States could have set buying ceilings on importers,
this was not practicable as part of a general freeze.
'°CPR 31, x6 FED. REG. 4184 (1951). "1 CPR 6r, x6 FED. REG. 7597 (1951).
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not to be seriously impaired. Uncontrolled prices on imported items could well
have disrupted efforts to freeze prices on similar domestic goods, especially con-
sumer items. Controls on export prices were necessary to prevent serious diversions
which could aggravate the inflationary pressures in the domestic markets and
so impair the effectiveness of a general freeze.
D. Record Keeping Requirements
Section 705(a) of the Defense Production Act of 195o (50 U. S. C. App. §2155(a)
(Supp. 1952)) authorized the President, while the Act was in effect and for a
period of two years thereafter, to require, among other things, the keeping of such
records as was necessary or appropriate, in his discretion, to the enforcement or the
administration of the Act and the regulations issued thereunder.
Since the central feature of a freeze is that it fixes ceiling prices on the basis of
the events during a base period, it is essential to both administration and enforcement
of a freeze that base period records be available. 2 Accordingly, Section i6 of the
GCPR required each seller to preserve those records in his possession showing the
prices charged by him during the base period. In addition, each seller was required to
prepare (I) a statement of the categories of commodities or services delivered or
offered for delivery by him in the base period; (2) a ceiling price list for the com-
modities and services delivered or offered for delivery by him during the base period;
and (3) a statement of his customary price differentials for terms and conditions of
sale and classes of purchases, which he had in effect during the base period.
Wholesalers and retailers were also required to preserve sufficient records to
establish the latest net cost incurred by them prior to the end of the base period in
purchasing commodities delivered or offered for delivery during the base period.
This information was necessary as a basis for fixing ceilings on other commodities
in the same categories.
Operators of restaurants were required to preserve all menus used by them in
the last ten days of the base period. Retailers were allowed to prepare their base
period ceiling price list by recording on their purchase invoices the prices at which
the commodities were delivered or offered for delivery in the base period.
Section i6 specified not only that these records be prepared and preserved, but also
that they be available for examination by OPS. This was necessary if the records
were to serve fully their purpose of assisting in securing compliance with and en-
forcement of ceiling prices. The section did not, however, specify how long the
records had to be kept. Later regulations followed the language of Section 705(a)
of the Act and required that base period records be kept for the life of the Act and
two years thereafter. Although Section i6 read literally seemed to require that base
period records be kept indefinitely, by interpretation the requirement was held
to be limited by the statutory authorization.3
'2 The general availability of base period records is a factor to be considered in selecting a base
period; generally the more recent the base period, the more likely it is that adequate base period records
can be found or prepared.
"This was confirmed when price controls were terminated in 1953, by GOR 44, 18 Fa. REGC.
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The statement of categories and the ceiling price list for all commodities or
services delivered or offered for delivery during the base period, were required to
be prepared on or before March I, i95i. This deadline was postponed, for retailers,
to March 22, i95,3 4 because a retailers' regulation was in preparation which made
unnecessary for some retailers the preparation of these statements.35
Closely akin to the .base period record requirement, in the sense that it also
related to the establishment of ceiling prices, was a provision that records showing
how a seller determined ceiling prices for commodities and services not sold by him
during the base period be kept for two years. The GCPR also required each seller
to keep for two years records of the kind which he customarily kept with respect to
current sales showing the prices he charged.
In later regulations, a more consistent practice was developed of requiring base
period and other records relating to the establishment of ceiling prices to be pre-
served for the life of the Act and two years thereafter, whereas records relating to
current sales were generally required to be kept for two years from the date. of the
transaction. This was believed to give OPS a reasonable time in which to com-
plete investigations and not to impose unreasonable burdens on business concerns.
Also, the requirements regarding records of current sales were spelled out in greater
detail in later regulations, which usually required as a minimum record the date,
the seller's name and address, the buyer's name and address, a detailed description
of the kind and quantity of items sold, the prices charged, and the terms and con-
ditions of sale. Frequently, commercial or industrial buyers were also required to
keep similar records regarding their purchases.
These more detailed record keeping provisions would not have been appropriate
in a general freeze covering a great range and variety of commodities, services,
sellers, and buyers. Detailed records of each sale obviously would have been in-
appropriate for retailers, for example.
The GCPR also required any seller who had customarily given a purchaser a
sales slip or receipt, to continue to do so. Furthermore, upon request by a buyer,
any seller, regardless of previous custom, was required to give the purchaser a receipt
showing the date, the name and address of the seller, the name of each commodity
or service sold, and the price received for it.
II
EXEMPTIONS
A basic decision inherent in the concept of a "general" freeze is that practically
all items subject to control shall be covered. It was therefore decided to list those
things to be excluded, rather than those to be included, since the exclusions would
comprise a much shorter list. This decision imposed the administrative burden
1477 (1953), which provided that in no event were records required to be kept after April 30, 1955, or
two years after the termination on April 30, 1953, of Title IV of the Defense Production Act of x95o
dealing with price controls.
" Amendment 3 to GCPR, x6 FED. REG. 1791 (1951).
35 CPR 7, Retail Ceiling Prices for Certain Consumer Goods, 16 FED. REO. 1872 (1951).
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of identifying and listing those specific areas where controls could not or should not
be imposed because of legal prohibitions or limitations, administrative difficulties, or
the necessities of the defense program.
In recognition of its interim character, and in contemplation of the issuance of
other regulations to replace it, the GCPR provided that it did not apply to com-
modities or services for which ceiling prices were then or later fixed by other OPS
price regulations. This provided an automatic and continuing mechanism whereby
items were excluded from the GCPR when and as they became subject to other
regulations.
In a few instances, items intended to be brought under specific regulations were
exempted from the general freeze in anticipation of specific regulatory action. These
cases were the exception; the general rule was that commodities, services, and trans-
actions intended to be covered by specific tailored regulations were to be subject to
the general freeze until specific tailored regulations could be prepared and issued.
Nevertheless, the few exceptions do illustrate the two functions of exclusions from
the general freeze: one-to exclude times which must or should be exempt from all
price controls; and two-to exclude items which should be exempt from a general
freeze but not from control under specific tailored regulations.88
A. Statutory Exemptions
When the GCPR was issued Section 402(e) of the Defense Production Act (50
U. S. C. App. §21o2(e) (Supp. 1952)) exempted the following from price control:
i. Prices or rentals for real property.
2. Fees for professional services.
3. Prices or rentals for materials for publication by any press association or feature
service, or for books, magazines, motion pictures, periodicals, or newspapers, other
than as waste or scrap; and rates charged by a newspaper, periodical, magazine, radio
broadcasting or television station, motion picture or other theater enterprise, or out-
door advertising facilities.
4. Rates charged in the insurance business.
5. Rates charged by any common carrier or other public utility.
6. Margin requirements on any commodity exchangeY 7
These exemptions were listed in Section 14 of the GCPR. In the main, they
covered areas not controlled during World War II and for which it was thought not
desirable to permit controls3
" OPS adopted specific techniques for dealing with these different kinds of exemptions. Exemptions
from the GCPR only were listed in the GCPR itself or in a supplementary regulation to the GCPR.
Exemptions from all price controls were listed in general overriding regulations which made the exemp-
tions effective not only as against the GCPR but also any other regulations issued by OPS.
"
7 Exemptions identical to numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5 above were included in Sec. 302(c) of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, except that the 1942 Act for obvious reasons contained no
specific reference to television stations.
"Rent controls for housing accommodations had been authorized under the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act of 1942, as amended, and continued under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947. 61 STAT. 193
(947), as amended, 5o U. S. C. App. §z88i (Supp. 1952). Thus authority to maintain rent controls
under certain circumstances was still in effect under a separate statute when the Defense Production
Act of 1950 was enacted, and rent controls were being administered by the Office of Rent Stabilization.
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A number of interpretative problems centered around the general question
whether royalties or payments for the right to enter on property represented a sale
or rental of real property or of a commodity or service. Thus, OPS took the position
that the furnishing of the usual parking facilities constituted storage services. Most
parking lot fees and charges were held to be subject to the GCPR, and later to the
services regulation, CPR 34, and remained generally under price control until the
termination of the program in i953. 9 Similarly storage of boats by a shipyard was
held to be a storage service rather than rental of real property.40 An exclusive license
to take coal or other natural resources from land upon payment of royalties was not
a sale or rental of real property but the sale of a commodity.4' Also held subject to
the general freeze were fees for licenses to enter upon land and leaue things there.42
In general, the exemption for sales or rentals of real property did not cover charges
for privileges or services connected with real estate, such as storage services, main-
tenance and janitorial services, and others of like character.
Neither the Act nor the GCPR originally specified the services included in the
exemption of professional services. Services performed by beauty shops and barber
shops were not considered professional services,43 although in 1951 Section 402(e)
was amended "' to exempt these services.
In general, the statutory exemption applied to those services where the work per-
formed was based on knowledge of an advanced type as contrasted with the applica-
tion of skill. Generally, also, professional services consistently required the exercise
of discretion and judgment, and could not be standardized, so that administratively
it would be most difficult to control fees for such services. In addition to doctors and
lawyers, professional engineers, architects, and certified public accountants seemed
clearly within the statutory exemption.
In July i95i, OPS exempted a long list of services, such as those of accountants,
dentists, engineers, lawyers, musicians, optometrists, physicians, statisticians, and
teachers. 44 The Statement of Considerations did not identify which were statutory
exemptions and which were exempt for administrative reasons, but stated that one
of the purposes of the action was to set forth the professional services exempt by the
Act.
Included was an exemption for prescriptions. OPA had ruled that the identical
professional service exemption in Section 302(c) of the Emergency Price Control
" See Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 85 Serv 32:218.3. Also Report and Recommenda-
tion of the Board of Review, In'the Matter of the Avenue Company, Protestant, OPS Loose Leaf Service,
201 OP 131. The Board's report was adopted as the opinion of the Director in the order dated March
26, 1952, denying the protest. OPA had taken the same position and was upheld in the courts. See
Carothers v. Bowles, 148 F. 2d 554 (E.C.A. X945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 875 (x94).
"0 Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 85 Serv. 32:202.55.
"'GCPR Interpretation 36, I6 FED. REo. 4192 (1951). In 1952, for administrative reasons, royalties
paid to a landowner in connection with the mining of iron ore were exempted from price control.
Amendment 32 to GOR 14, 17 FED. REo. 11646 (X952).
"Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 85 Serv 32:202.33.
" GCPR Interpretation 37, x6 FED. REG. 4192 (i951).
"5065 STAT. 131, 135 (195), 50 U. S. C. App. §21o2(e)(vii) (Supp. 1952).
" GOR 14, 16 FED. REG. 6664 (195i).
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Act of 1942 did not apply to the filling of a prescription by a pharmacist, on the
ground that such a transaction involved the sale of a commodity.45 Accordingly,
OPS could have adopted the same construction, on the theory that the re-enactment
of the language of the Price Control Act constitued a ratification of the OPA ruling.
However, in the discussion on the Senate floor on the conference bill which became
the Defense Production Act, it was stated that the conferees had agreed that the
professional services exemption applied to fees charged by a pharmacist in filling a
prescription 4
OPS sought to escape the dilemma by exempting the fees of pharmacists for
filling prescriptions only (i) if the prescription contained written directions for
use signed by a physician,47 (2) if it required the services of a registered pharmacist,
and (3) if the pharmacist transposed the written directions from the prescription to
the label on the package. A sale of a product by a registered pharmacist which
did not meet these three conditions was treated as a sale of a commodity and not
exempt4
The reluctance to exempt all sales by registered pharmacists was because in
many cases the "professional service" aspect of the transaction was completely
subordinate and incidental to the sale of a commodity. Medicine, drugs, and medi-
cal supplies purchased from drug stores employing registered pharmacists repre-
sented a substantial volume of dollar sales, and OPS was reluctant to remove all
controls from what could be an important element of cost for many consumers.
Physicians also occasionally supply their patients with drugs or medical supplies.
This activity on the part of a doctor, however, is dearly only incidental to his prin-
cipal function, which is the furnishing of professional services. Because of the prac-
tical difficulties of separating the purely professional services of a doctor from his
incidental sale of medicines, the entire transaction was considered exempt as a pro-
fessional service. This approach was more justified, of course, where the furnishing
of the commodity was an exceptional and incidental part of the transaction, as in
the case of doctors, than where the supply of the commodity was the primary and
usual feature of the transaction, as in many cases of filling prescriptions.
OPS also took the position that the sale of frames, lenses, and other opthalmic
supplies by optometrists constituted sales of commodities. A year after the issuance
of the GCPR, however, OPS acquiesced in the requests of optometrists that both
the services they rendered and the furnishing of opthalmic supplies be exempt 9
The action was limited to services and supplies furnished by an optometrist in
making and filling his own prescription, however, so that the sale of supplies pre-
"' Letter of July 21, 1942, from Price Administrator Henderson to the National Association of Retail
Druggists.
do97 CoNG. REc. 14o6o, 14074 (1950).
'
1 A subsequent amendment extended the scope of the exemption to cover the case where a prac-
titioner furnished an oral prescription and promptly thereafter reduced it to writing. Amendment 31,
GO1R 14, 17 FED. REG. 11443 (1952).
4" See memorandum of April 21, i95i, from Harold Levanthal to Alfred Letzler.
" Amendment 6 to GOR 14, 17 FED. REG. 545 (1952).
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pared in accordance with someone else's prescriptions or not based on a prescription
continued to be subject to ceilings as a sale of commodities'
The exemption for the press, publications, and broadcasting and theater enter-
prises, like the similar exemption in the Emergency Price Control Act, was intended
as a guarantee that price controls would not interfere with the media of public in-
formation.5 The exemption for a "motion picture or other theater enterprise" in-
cluded symphony orchestras, operas, and ballets! 2 It did not, however, include
such affairs as sports events, or automobile or livestock shows,5" in view of the
statutory purpose to protect freedom of expression . 4
The exemption for outdoor advertising facilities apparently was an attempt to put
these enterprises in a comparable position to that of newspapers and other periodicals,
whose advertising charges were exempt. Rates for advertising which was neither
on outdoor facilities nor in newspapers or periodicals, however, were not exempt.
The exemption for insurance rates was apparently based on a belief that these
rates were already adequately controlled under state law. A seller of commodities
who made a charge for a warranty of serviceability was not in the insurance business
within the meaning of the statutory exemption, however, and the warranty was con-
sidered to be a service for purposes of price control.55
The exemption for margin requirements on commodity exchanges was not in-
cluded in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Apparently it was felt that
such controls were not needed because of the belief that voluntary action by the
exchanges themselves was adequate.
i. Exemptions for Common Carriers and Other Public Utilities. Rates charged
by common carriers or other public utilities were exempt because of the belief that
their charges were generally regulated by other public regulatory bodies. The Act,
itself, however, exempted all public utilities whether their rates were regulated by
a governmental agency or not. Since the rates of many common carriers and other
public utilities in fact were not subject to regulation by any public body, the statu-
tory exemption left a substantial area subject to no controls at all.'  This created
administrative difficulties for OPS with regard to related controlled areas. For ex-
"oAmendment 14 to GOR 14, x7 FED. REo. 4292 (1952), stated that the exemption applied to the
filling or refilling of his own prescription by an optometrist.
"' Consistent with this legislative policy, OPS later exempted printed commodities whose primary
value depended on editorial comment, expression of ideas, or dissemination of information, as well as
the printing and allied services in connection therewith, Amendment i to GOR 8, x6 Fin. Rio. 4493
(I951).
52OPS General Interpretatons 5, 16 Fm. REG. 11686 (195x); OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg 95:1.
" Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 85 Serv 32:202.A6; 85 Serv 61:203a.23. Also see SR
ii to CPR 34, 17 FED. REG. 820 (1952) (specifying dollars-and-cents ceilings on admission charges
to major league professional baseball games).
"In the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, Congress included a special provision exempt-
ing prices charged by bowling alleys. Sec. 109(c), 1952 Amendments. 66 STAT. 296, 299 (1952).
" Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 85 Serv 32:202.43.
"In construing a similar exemption under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the Emergency
Court of Appeals held that the exempting clause applied to all common carriers without exception,
and was not limited to those whose rates are regulated by other federal or state authorities. Dunham
and Reid v. Porter, 157 F. 2d 1022 (E.C.A. 1946).
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ample, contract carriers who were subject to control could see no justification for
the statutory exemption of those common carriers who were not subject to rate
regulation by any other public agency and so were left free of any controls.
The Defense Production Act contained no definition of a public utility. A de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court, however, construing a similar exemption
in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,'7 contained an analysis of the problem
which OPS used as a guidepost in the administration of the Defense Production Act.
The Supreme Court held that even a business not usually identified as a public
utility would still be included in the statutory exemption if it had been appropriately
classified as a public utility by a federal, state or local law, and if its rates were
actually regulated by a federal, state or local regulatory body exercising rate regula-
tory jurisdiction. In holding a warehouse in that case to be a public utility, the
Supreme Court said that Congress had not intended to supersede the power of a state
regulatory commission exercising comprehensive control over the prices of a business
appropriately classified as a public utility by the state constitution and by state statute.
The identification of a public utility entitled to the statutory exemption presented
the least problems, of course, in those cases involving a "conventional' utility such
as a gas or electric light and power company. Where one of these held itself out
to serve the general public upon reasonable demand, at fixed uniform rates, it was
exempt even if its rates were not subject to regulation by some public body.
On the other hand, a business was not a public utility if it did not hold itself out
to serve the public at fixed nondiscriminatory rates. Thus, a motor carrier of milk,
who was free to change his service and route at will, was not a common carrier under
the statutory exemption. 8
Other services or commodities sold by a public utility did not come within the
statutory exemption unless they were an incidental and inseparable part of the public
utility service or unless they were regulated as a public utility service. The sale of
equipment was not generally regarded as part of the rate charged by a public
utility and so was not exempt. 9
The extension of the public utility exemption to businesses not in the conventional
public utility category, though required by the Supreme Court's decision, made
it look as though OPS were exempting some public utilities-those whose rates were
subject to public regulation-and refusing to exempt others-whose rates were not
so regulated. Yet, as the Supreme Court concluded, it .was only logical that in a
borderline case the question whether a particular service was a public utility should
be made to turn on whether it was classified and regulated as a public utility under
federal, state or local law.
One difficulty the layman had with this approach, of course, was that the same
kind of service was subject to price control in one state or community and exempt
in another. As an example, some terminal facilities, classified as public utilities by
" Davies Warchouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144 (1944).
" Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg I1:21 4 f.3.
"'Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg ir:2I4f.1.
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the applicable state laws and under effective regulatory jurisdiction of local gov-
ernmental units, were exempt from price control. Others, including some municipal
facilities, performing the same functions but not classified and regulated under
state law as public utilities, were not exempt.
OPS, for administrative reasons, had exempted services furnished directly by a
federal, state or local government unit but had excluded from the exemption terminal,
dock and warehouse services.6 During the pendency in the Court of Appeals of
appeals from the denial by OPS of protests filed by certain West Coast municipally
owned port facilities operating cold storage warehouses, further administrative action
was taken to delete this exception, so that terminal, dock and warehouse services
furnished by governmental units were included in the general exemption of gov-
ernmental services. 1 The complaint in the Emergency Court of Appeals was
thereupon dismissed as moot.6 2
The controversy over the regulation of marine terminal services, however, was
directly or indirectly related to two further statutory exemptions added to the De-
fense Production Act in 1952. The first of these extended the public utility exemp-
tion already in the Act to include rates charged by any person subject to the Ship-
ping Act of 1916.63 Common carriers by water, who were subject to the Shipping
Act of 1916 and whose rates were subject to regulation by the Federal Maritime
Board, were already exempt from the Defense Production Act as common carriers.
The only effect of the 1952 amendment thus was to bring within the exemption
marine terminals, which were subject to the Shipping Act and to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Maritime Board but only for the purpose of preventing discriminatory
rates and practices.
The other 1952 amendment provided an exemption for materials or services
supplied by the states, territories, and possessions of the United States, their political
subdivisions and municipalities, the District of Columbia, and any agency of any
of these.64
Oddly enough, this general exemption did not include materials and services
supplied by agencies of the Federal Government. Apparently this decision was in-
fluenced by the fact that the Federal Government was a seller of metal scrap, and
the belief that a blanket exemption would have serious effects on scrap prices. OPS,
however, by various administrative actions, issued miscellaneous exemptions for
sales of commodities by different agencies of the Federal Government and as indi-
cated above had issued a general exemption for sales of services by the Federal
Government as well as state and local governments.
The West Coast municipal corporations operating cold storage warehouses had
contended, among other things, that the rates for those facilities were regulated by
"
0Amendment 2 to GOR 14, 16 FED. REG. 9563 (i95i).
"
1 Amendment 9 to GOR 14, 17 FED. REG. 2657 (195z).
"judgment dismissing complaint dated June z7, 1952, Port of Seattle and Port of Tacoma v. Arnall,
No. 594, Emergency Court of Appeals.
"'Sec. io9(b), Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, supra note 54.
6 Sec. xog(c), Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, supra note 54.
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a governmental regulatory body because each municipal corporation fixed its own
prices under statutory authority. This argument, which was rejected by OPS, could
have been made, of course, by any governmental unit selling a commodity or service.
The argument furthermore would have in effect read government agencies out of
the definition of "person" in the Defense Production Act, which specifically included
the United States or any other government.
It was clear under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and originally
under the Defense Production Act of i95o that Congress meant to include federal,
state and local government agencies as persons subject to price control.6 5 The 1952
amendment indicated a shift in congressional intent in so far as state and local
governments were concerned.
Congress in 1952 also exempted a number of miscellaneous services performed by
or for common carriers.66
B. Statutory Limitations-Agricultural Commodities
The first sentence of Section 4 o2(d) (3) of the Defense Production Act (50 U. S. C.
App. §2102(d) (3) (Supp. 1952)) prohibited ceilings on any agricultural commodity
below the parity price for the commodity as determined by the Secretary of Agri-
culture. A general freeze, therefore, could not legally fix ceilings on agricultural
commodities based on selling prices in the base period if those selling prices were
below the parity prices.67
Section 14 of the GCPR exempted raw and and unprocessed agricultural com-
modities sold by a producer, even where an agricultural commodity was at or
above the statutory minimum price. On the other hand, the regulation fixed ceilings
on distributors' prices even for agricultural commodities selling below the statutory
minimum. However, distributors' ceilings were subject to the parity adjustment
provision in Section ii, under which the exact amount of increases in prices paid
producers could be passed on through all subsequent stages of distribution.
The Statement of Considerations explained the exemption as follows:
Raw and unprocessed agricultural commodities when sold by the producer have been
exempted, first, because the freeze technique is at present administratively impracticable
when applied to sales by individual farmers, and, second, because the current prices
of most such commodities are below the minimum price levels at which ceilings may
be established under the Act.
" See, with respect to the identical definition in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Case v.
Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946); Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, 327 U. S. 105 (1946).
" Sec. zog(b), Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, supra note 54. These additional
statutory exemptions were specifically set forth in Amendment 18 to GOR 14, 17 FFD. REG. 6703 (x952).
Some of these had been previously exempted by OPS on administrative grounds by Amendment ix
to GOR 14, 17 FED. REG. 3234 (1952), but the exemptions for toilet and parking facilities operated
by common carriers were new.
" Sec. 104(b) of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951, supra note 43a, added an addi-
tional limitation, prohibiting a ceiling for any agricultural commodity below 90 per cent of the price
received by producers on May ig, 1951, as determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. This was part
of the anti-rollback legislation adopted in 1951; it was not, of course, a problem in January, 1951, when
the general freeze was-issued.
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Section 402(d) (3) of the Act also prohibited ceilings on any commodity processed
or manufactured in whole or substantial part from any agricultural commodity
below a price which would reflect to producers of the agricultural commodity a
price equal to the statutory minimum, usually 'the parity price. To avoid any
conflict with this provision, Section ii, the so-called parity pass-through section, per-
mitted the amount of increases in prices of agricultural commodities to be added to
their ceilings by processors and manufacturers.6 8
Neither the Defense Production Act nor the GCPR defined agricultural commod-
ity. For the purposes of the first sentence of Section 402(d) (3), however, only com-
modities for which the Secretary of Agriculture fixed parity prices were considered
agricultural commodities.69 Since the statutory limitation required a comparison
with parity prices, the agricultural commodity provision could be applied only
where there was a parity price determination. A broader definition of agri-
cultural commodity might have made it impossible ever to impose ceilings on com-
modities for which the Secretary of Agriculture did not determine parity prices, a
conclusion clearly not intended. The listed agricultural commodities eligible for
"parity adjustments" under Section ii were those for which the Secretary of Agri-
culture had in fact determined parity prices.
The first amendment to the GCPR limited the exemption to the specific agri-
cultural commodities which were then selling below parity, but expanded the ex-
emption to include all sales, not only producers' sales, so long as the agricultural
commodity was sold in its raw or natural state, or in the first form or state in which
it was customarily sold by producers.70 One purpose and effect of this was to
include in the exemption transactions on the commodity exchanges.
Commodities selling below parity are not likely to be in short supply, and it was
believed that competition should be effective in holding distributors' margins in line.
In addition, it was stated that ceilings determined by the freeze technique were
not suitable for transactions on commodity exchanges. 71
Since a major reason for the exemption of agricultural commodities selling below
parity was the statutory obligation to allow these commodities to reach parity levels,
OPS was concerned with the problems of terminating the exemption when the
statutory conditions were satisfied. The first step, as indicated, was to limit the
exemption to commodities actually below parity levels. Then, as a further step, it
was provided that the exemption and the parity adjustment benefits would terminate
automatically five days after the date on which the Secretary of Agriculture an-
nounced by publication a prevailing price for an agricultural commodity which
satisfied the statutory minimum. 2
"This parity adjustment provision is discussed in greater detail in another study.
Go See, for example, Opinion, Legislation, Research and Opinions Division, Office of Chief Counsel,
OPS MANUAL Pt. 5, c. 3, §2.55.
7
°Amendment i to GCPR, 16 Fmn. RaG. 1503 (ig5i). The amendment also made it clear that
the exemption of specified agricultural commodities applied to imported as well as domestic commodities.
'Earlier, OPS had issued SR 3 to the GCPR, 16 FaED. REG. 1503 (i95i), which included a section
prescribing special ceilings for certain agricultural commodities selling above parity and sold on com-
modity exchanges.
" Amendment 7 to GCPR, 16 FEn. REG. 2546 (1951). The amendment further provided that
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Subsequently, OPS reversed itself on both steps. 73 It found the provision for
automatic deletion from the list of agricultural commodities eligible for parity ad-
justments unnecessary, since the Director of Price Stabilization was able to act
promptly by specific amendment when a parity level was reached. This procedure
avoided confusion as to which commodities were or were not on the list, and also
retained in the Director greater flexibility to make such specific provisions as might
be found necessary to maintain a balanced price structure.
At the same time, OPS reverted to the original technique whereby sales of agri-
cultural commodities were exempt, at the producer level, whether they were selling
below or above parity. Subsequent sellers were brought back under margin control,
even on commodities selling below parity. The Statement of Considerations indicated
that the freeze technique was administratively impracticable for fixing ceilings for
individual farmers, and that the regulation of distributors' margins would be the
most effective method of control in this area.
Almost immediately it was discovered that the exemption of producers' sales only
had "inadvertently" brought commodity exchange transactions back under control.
The exemption was again revised to include sales on commodity exchanges of raw
agricultural commodities selling below parity. This was accomplished by making
agricultural commodities in their raw or natural state exempt generally, but limiting
the exemption for a seller other than a producer to those commodities listed as being
below parity levels.74
An agricultural commodity in its raw or natural state generally meant only
the raw materials produced on the farm, before they were refined, manufactured or
processed. Products derived from agricultural commodities, even though considered
raw materials for manufacturing or processing purposes, were not entitled to the
exemption.
C. Administrative Exemptions
Section 4 02(f) of the Defense Production Act (5o U. S. C. App. §2102(f) (Supp.
1952)) authorized exemptions where necessary to promote the national defense, or
where ceilings were not necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stabilization pro-
gram. Under this statutory authority OPS embarked on a program of administrative
exemptions which began with the issuance of the GCPR and continued up to the
termination of price controls in 1953. The policies and standards evolved under
this continuing program, although they had their beginnings in the GCPR, are not
within the scope of this study. Even so, any study of a general freeze would be
incomplete without at least a description and a brief analysis of discretionary ex-
emptions.
The early exemption policy was based on a desire to avoid interference with
essential supply of military materials or services, and also on the feeling that a better
upon termination of an exemption, ceilings were to be determined under the GCPR, but using the most
recent five week period preceding the date the exemption was removed, as a base period.
"Amendment 13 to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 5051 (1951).
" Amendment 14 to GCPR, x6 FaD. REG. 5119 (1951).
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over-all job of stabilizing the economy could be done if the time and energies of the
agency were not dissipated on matters of no real importance. Yet, it was recog-
nized that a balance had to be struck between these considerations and the funda-
mental objective of stabilizing prices across-the-board. Too free a hand with ex-
emptions of "essential" materials and services could have carved such a large slice
out of the GCPR that the regulation would have become a hollow shell of a
"general freeze." Substantial areas were already beyond the control of the agency
because of the statutory exemptions and the statutory limitations with respect to
agricultural commodities.
Even a program of exemptions of items apparently of little significance had to
be administered with care. Most any industry could be fragmentized to such a
degree that each separate little part, treated by itself, would appear to be so in-
significant as not to make ceilings necessary. Yet, if carried far enough, this process
could include in the aggregate such a substantial part of the nation's economy as to
make serious inroads in the coverage of the general freeze, and its value as a gen-
eral lid on prices. In addition, exemption of items having little direct stabilization
impact might result in the diversion of necessary manpower and materials from
more important activities. Notwithstanding these obvious dangers of any exemption
program under a "general" freeze, OPS, as OPA had, did exclude a number of
materials and services from the general freeze. In the main, these exemptions
served to give the agency more time to deal with the more important problems
arising under the GCPR.75
Underlying most of the exemptions was the administrative difficulty of im-
posing controls on a particular commodity, service, or seller. In some cases, the
administrative difficulty, while not insurmountable, led to exemption because of the
insignificant nature of the item and the consequent belief that the benefits to the
stabilization program of controls were not worth the trouble. In other cases, the
administrative difficulties were so serious, on an absolute basis, that controls were
considered impractical even though an important item was involved. In still other
cases, the administrative difficulties were weighed against the possible repercussions
on the defense effort in deciding in favor of an exemption.
i. Administrative Exemptions for Unimportant Items. Among the things exempt
for reasons of administrative impracticability and relative insignificance in the sta-
bilization program when the GPR was issued were:
Stamps, coins, precious stones, and paintings and other objects of art.
Antiques (commodities made prior to 1850).
Used personal or household effects sold by a private owner.
Used household or personal effects sold at a bona fide auction.
Damaged commodities sold by insurance companies, transportation companies, the
United States Government, or by persons engaged primarily in the business of selling
" One of the early exemptions after the issuance of the GCPR was for sphygmo-oscillomcters.
GOR, 5, 16 FrD. PREG. 3408 (i95i). Mr. DiSalle was reported to have stated that this item was
exempted so that he would not have to learn how to spell it.
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damaged commodities received from insurance companies, transportation companies or
the United States in direct connection with the adjustment of losses.
Abandoned or confiscated property sold by Government agencies or pursuant to a court
decree.
American Indian and Eskimo handicraft objects.
Commodities produced by a seller in his own home without assistance of hired employees,
not exceeding $200 per month.
Commodities grown and processed on his own farm by a farmer, not exceeding $200 per
month.
Many of these exemptions had been included in the GMPR by OPA. Objects
of art included paintings, sculptures, and similar unique art products of individual
skill. Later OPS also exempted imported oriental rugs, stating they, like paintings
and antiques, depended for their value on intangible subjective considerations which
made the fixing of price ceilings extremely difficult.70 Oriental rugs were also among
the nonstandardized luxury items exempted from the GMPR by OPA during World
War II.
The exemption for used household or personal effects did not apply to sales by an
establishment regularly engaged in selling such commodities other than by auction.
This exemption was eventually extended to cover all used supplies or equipment sold
by a person who had not acquired or produced them for the purpose of sale. 7 Most
such sales of used supplies or equipment were occasional in nature, had little effect
on the general price structure, and were administratively difficult to price under a
base period freeze technique.78 Scrap and waste materials were not used supplies
or equipment under the exemption. Sales of scrap and waste materials, especially
by industrial or commercial concerns, in many instances were not occasional in
nature but a regular part of a continuing business operation.
The exemption not only was limited to commodities which would otherwise
have been subject to the GCPR, but in addition did not apply to commodities for
which a specific supplementary regulation to the GCPR had been issued. Thus,
used comnodities which were important enough to be the subject of a specific ceiling
price regulation or a specific supplementary regulation were not exempt. Used
passenger automobiles and used machine tools, for example, which were covered by
specific regulations, were not exempt.79
The exemption of used items relieved the agency as well as sellers of difficult
administrative problems. The limitation of the exemption to sales by a person who
had acquired the commodity for use, leaving controls in effect on sales by dealers,
'aAmendment i, GOR 5, 16 FED. R G. 5622 (I951).
"'Amendment 26 to GCPR, z6 FED. RaG. 12819 (195). The exemption did not apply to sales
of used commodities by the United States Government, but these were already generally exempted by
SR i to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. ioo6 (x95I), and SR 72 to GCPR, i6 FED. REG. 10159 (1951).
"' Amendment 29 to GCPR, 17 FED. REG. 1936 (1952), made it clear that the exemption did not
apply to used rails or trackwork, sold by railroads not on an occasional basis but regularly at standardized
prices.
"°SR 5 to GCPR, x6 FED. R G. 1769 (z95i) (used automobiles); CPR 8o, 16 FE. REG. 10254
(195i) (used machine tools).
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was a safeguard against price excesses on used goods. In times of extreme infla-
tionary pressures, where there are real or speculative shortages, prices for used com-
modities may well exceed those for new ones. Of course, if shortages were serious
enough, exemptions for sales by users might lead to dealers generally being bypassed
and all sales being made between the original users and new users. Notwithstand-
ing the possibility of some abuses, the exemption appeared to have been a desirable
one, certainly as originally limited to used personal or household effects. While
more doubt exists as to the wisdom of the broader exemption of used commodities
as part of the original issuance of a general freeze, even this broader action seems
desirable to relieve administrative problems in what are largely unimportant areas.
The exemptions for abandoned or confiscated property sold by government
agencies or pursuant to a court decree, for damaged commodities sold in connection
with adjustment of losses, as well as a subsequent exemption of judicial sales, 0 were
also based on the considerations that the sales involved were of a nonrecurring
nature, and so did not usually constitute a continuing factor in business or living
costs; such sales constituted an insignificant fraction of total sales, not only in the
economy as a whole, but with respect to any particular commodity; and failure to
control prices on such sales would not result in substantial pressure on other prices.
These exemptions did not free the commodities absolutely from price control.
In the majority of cases covered by the exemptions, the commodities were pur-
chased for resale, and on such resales ceiling price restrictions applied. Thus, in
each case, control on resale prices constituted an indirect check on the exempt sales.
Furthermore, the exemption for judicial sales specifically did not extend to sales by
a trustee or other person engaged in continuing a business under court order.
Commodities made by a seller in his own home for his own account, and com-
modities grown and. processed on his own farm by a farmer, were exempt up to
$200 a month. The extent of inflation since pre-World-War II days might be
measured by the fact that similar exemptions by OPA were limited to sales of $75
per month. Under OPS the more liberal figure of $200 was soon increased to $xooo
per month.8 '
Eventually, further to carry out the original intent to exempt commodities sold
by very small producers, the exemption was broadened to include any producer whose
gross sales were not more than $25,ooo per year for all units under his ownership and
control.82  The justification was that retention of controls on these small producers
served no worth-while purpose, while exemption would have no appreciable effect
on the cost of living, the defense effort, or the level of industrial and commercial
costs. Producers of logs, pulpwood, and related forest products, however, were not
included in the exemption. It was believed that such a large percentage of these
commodities were supplied by small producers that this kind of exemption would
have seriously impaired price control for those commodities.
:0 GOR 28, 17 FE. REG. 3677 (1952).
'
1 Amendment x9 to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 10310 (951).
"' Amendment 33 to GCPR, 17 FED. REG. 7487 (1952).
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A small business exemption for services, included in the general overriding regu-
lation covering services exemptions, exempted services supplied by any individual in
his own home if the total amount sold in the preceding year did not exceed $5ooo.
A regulation for expanded exemptions of small service establishments, comparable
to the small producer exemptions, was well advanced in OPS by late 1952, but was
never issued because of the accelerated program for termination of price controls.
Another small business exemption covered printers whose printing business was
not more than $5o,ooo in the preceding year." OPA had a similar exemption,
limited, however, to printers whose annual sales did not exceed $2o,ooo.
The pricing of new commodities was one field in which the freeze technique was
least effective. In an effort to--minimize the administrative problems in this area,
OPS early developed procedures for exempting new insignificant or experimental
commodities, at least until their sales volume reached a level where controls became
practicable and worth while.
The first action in this direction was the exemption of small quantity sales of
new and experimental chemicals by producers s5 A new chemical was one not sold
by the manufacturer during or prior to the base period, and it was exempt until
total sales of that item exceeded $iooo. Experimental chemicals were exempt even
after sales reached $iooo, provided OPS did not disapprove the manufacturer's re-
port explaining, among other things, why the chemical was considered to be in the
experimental stage and stating the volume of production which would represent
commercial production. Experimental products in some other commodity areas
were also exempt, such as experimental rubber products, s" drugs,T and metals !
8
Also, in order to reduce reporting requirements and the administrative work load
on OPS, the amount of total sales of an experimental item exempt without the
necessity of filing a report was raised to $25,000.
Exemptions of small quantity sales of new and experimental commodities served
a valuable purpose in minimizing the administrative burdens on OPS and manu-
facturers. Even during a period of full-scale mobilization, there are always num&ous
new products being introduced, many of which are short-lived and of insignificant
importance to the economy so long as sales are in small quantity. This was even
more true in a period of partial mobilization such as 1950-1953. These new products
presented problems which required a disproportionate part of the agency's attention,
without making a commensurate contribution to the stabilization program. With
proper safeguards, limited exemptions in this area reduced the workload without
seriously affecting the effectiveness of controls.
8 GOR I4, 16 FED. REG. 6664 (1951).
", Amendment i to GOR 8, 6 Fed.- Reg. 4493 (950). Amendment 7 to GOR 8, x7 FE. REG.
xz8z6 (1952), made it clear that the exemption covered sales of printed commodities as well as print-
ing services.
8 5 GOR 3, 16 FED. REG. 3216 (1951).
"
8 Amendment i to GOR 3, 16 FED. REo. 5056 (ig5i).
"' Amendment 5 to GOR 3, 17 FED. REa. 7275 (952).
" Amendment 25 to GOR 9, 17 FED. REG. 7488 (1952). Originally only experimental ferro-alloys,
ferro-metals, and ferro-compounds had been exempted. Amendment 17 to GOR 9, 17 FED. REG.
3676 (1952).
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Soon after the GCPR was issued, a series of actions authorized exemptions re-
lating to specified nonprofit organizations. These included sales of blind-made
products by nonprofit agencies for the blind,s" articles bearing official marks of the
Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts, sales by the Future Farmers of America, CARE relief
packages, official supplies of the 4-H Clubs and the Camp Fire Girls, sales of used
and waste supplies by the Salvation Army, Goodwill Industries, Volunteers of
America, Society of St. Vincent De Paul, and Junior League, and supplies of the
Independent Order of Odd Fellows.90 Closely related to these were the early ex-
emptions of charges made by hospitals and educational institutionsY
Summer camps not being in operation during the base period of December 2o,
195o to January 26, 1951, ceilings would have had to be determined by individual
or group applications. The administrative difficulties of setting specific ceilings,
coupled with the imminence of the summer camp season, led to a temporary sus-
pension from control of rates for 195.2 The exemption pointed out that camps were
quasi-educational, and in many instances were of a nonprofit or charitable nature.
When ceiling rates were issued for the 1952 season, the exemption was continued for
nonprofit summer camps for children whose charges did not exceed $3o per week.93
Towards the end of the program, rates of all children's summer camps were
exempt.9 4
Charitable, educational and related other nonprofit organizations were the sort
of thing that could be exempt from a general freeze, either initially or soon after
its issuance, without serious consequences. OPS followed the more cautious policy of
exempting certain charitable or nonprofit organizations by name, such as the Sal-
vation Army. It would seem that at least the specific organizations exempted by
OPS could be included in the exemptions from a future general freeze without
impairing its effectiveness.
The early practice and policy with respect to exemptions of unimportant com-
modities and services was reflected in an operating instruction issued to the OPS
staff in August i950.' This instruction, as revised approximately a year later,90
stated that exemptions would be approved when the following conditions were
satisfied:
i. (a) The material or service does not enter significantly into the cost of living of
the average American family or into business costs; or
(b) Control of the material or service involves administrative difficulties for OPS
or the sellers of the material or service which are disproportionate in relation tco the
8 9GOR i, x6 FED. REG. 2834 (I95i).
00 GOR 6, x6 FED. REG. 3484 (1951), and various amendments thereto.
9 SR 15 to GCPR, x6 FED. REG. 2908 (ig5i).
°2Amendment i to SR 15, 16 FED. REG. 3407 (195I). Subsequently, ceiling rates for the 1952
season for summer camps for children were set at either the price charged during the i95o season plus
8 per cent, or the price charged during the i951 season, when rates were exempted from control. SR
12 to CPR 34, 17 FED. REG. 1184 (1952).
"
1Amendment 8 to GOR, 14, 17 FED. REG. xi86 (1952).
"
4 Amendment 31 to GOlR 14, 17 F D. REG. 11443 (1952).
"VOPS Price Operations Memorandum No. 5, Exemptions from Price Control, Aug. 5, 1951.
o' OPS MANUAL Pt. 4, c. i, §5, Exemption Standards.
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effectiveness of the control or the contribution to the price stabilization program;
2. The material or service is appropriately separable from other materials or services
and is not merely a subdivision of a broader area;
3. There is no evidence to show that decontrol of the material or service will have a
significant adverse effect on the price level when considered in conjunction with previous
decontrol of related materials or services;
4. Exemption from control of the material or service presents no substantial threat
of diversion of materials and manpower from sellers remaining under control.
2. Exemptions Based Primarily on Administrative Difficulties. While most
discretionary exemptions were based in part at least on grounds of administrative
difficulties, in most of the cases already discussed the administrative problems justi-
fied exemption principally because of the relative insignificance of the commodities,
services, or transactions involved.
In the agricultural and food fields, particularly, a number of exemptions based
primarily on grounds of administrative difficulty involved relatively important com-
modities. In many of these cases, the desire to avoid interference with maintenance
of supply was also a contributing factor.
The exemption for all raw and unprocessed agricultural commodities sold by
producers, which covered a relatively important area, was, as indicated earlier, based
upon mixed administrative and statutory considerations.7
Fresh fruits, vegetables and tree nuts,9 and fresh fish, seafood, and game, were
also exempt for administrative reasons. Again, while many fruits and vegetables
were selling below parity prices, the exemption was not limited to the below parity
items, and unlike the exemption for other agricultural commodities, it was not even
limited to producers but applied at all levels of sales. The exemption was justified
on the ground that unusual marketing factors and seasonable and perishable char-
acteristics made these commodities subject to sharp and unforeseeable price fluctua-
tions, so that the imposition of a general freeze on these commodities would lead to
capricious and inequitable price results." It was added, however, that as soon as
practicable the Director would issue regulations specifically adapted to these un-
usual factors.'
In fact, OPS never attempted to fix ceilings for any fresh fruits or vegetables,
except white flesh" potatoes, for which a regulation was issued in January 1952.101
"'The agricultural commodity exemptions were made applicable to the same commodities produced
in the territories and possessions, by Amendment 20 to GCPR, i6 FED. REG. 10384 (1951).
"
8 This exemption was subsequently expanded specifically to provide that fresh fruits included berries
and tree nuts. Amendment 13 to GCPR, 16 Fan. REG. 5051 (1951).
"Amendment ii to GCPR, x6 FED. REG. 4697 (195), added frozen fish and shellfish to the
exemption, for the same reasons.
" Charges for services in connection with harvesting and marketing of fresh fruits, vegetables, ber-
ries, and tree nuts were later exempted by Amendment 2 to SR 15, GCPR, 16 FED. RG. 4196 (1951).
This exemption was finally continued indefinitely after the statutory prohibition on ceilings for fruits
and vegetables. Amendment 9 to SR 15, GCPR, 17 FED. REG. 10543 (1952).
1 0 1CPR 113, 17 FED. REG. 194 (952). Potatoes had been exempted previously at all levels of sale
because the market prices had been below the level necessary to return the legal minimum to producers.
CPR 113 was issued because market prices had advanced up to the legal minimum and threatened to
continue advancing. The regulation was revoked on June 24, 1952, just prior to adoption of a stat-
utory prohibition of ceilings on fruits and vegetables.
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And even this regulation was revoked in anticipation of or in a vain attempt to fore-
stall the 1952 amendment to the Defense Production Act which prohibited the im-
position of ceilings on processed as well as fresh fruits and vegetables.102
The GCPR also contained an exemption for all live animals, including beef
cattle, hogs, and sheep, all important factors in the cost of living. Although the
prices of live animals were generally above the minimum standards of the Act, OPS
felt that price control could be more adequately effected at that time by freezing
prices at the processing and distribution levels only. The Statement of Considerations
again prophesied that tailored livestock ceilings would be issued as soon as possible.
In taking this approach, OPS recognized the inherent difficulties of setting ceilings
on live animals, particularly by a freeze technique. OPS shortly thereafter did issue
a regulation which set ceilings on the amounts buyers could pay for live cattle. 3
Considerations of essential supply loomed large in the exemptions for a list of
oil-bearing materials and oils, and for pine gum and American-Egyptian cotton.
These items were considered essential to the defense effort, and in the opinion of the
Department of Agriculture, ceiling prices at the base period level would have
precluded the importation of the oil-bearing materials and oils,10 4 and would have
deterred necessary increases in production of pine gum' 05 and American-Egyptian
cotton.106
Stumpage, the right to sever timber from the stump on the land of another
person, had been exempt by OPA, and a supplementary regulation issued soon after
the GCPR followed the OPA example. Contributing factors were the administrative
difficulties and the fact that a large percentage of timber was owned by federal
agencies.107 Ceilings continued in effect for lumber and most other wood products.
A combination of seasonal and supply problems led to the exemption of sales
of sawmill logs produced and used in Alaska. Because of the seasonal nature of this
industry, the base period prices were not appropriate, and OPS administratvely was
not able to prepare specific ceilings in time for the 1951 season. Rather than dis-
rupt the marketing season, OPS exempted sales for the balance of the 1951 season.'08
Reagent chemicals for research, hog-cholera virus and anti-hog cholera serum, and
crude domestic botanical drugs, exempted by OPS in the early days after the issuance
of the GCPR, followed similar actions by OPA. These exemptions were motivated
..
2 Sec. io6(b), Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, 66 STAT. 298. This was a part of the
general movement toward elimination of all controls.
... CPR 23, Live Cattle, 16 FED. REG. 3696 (195i).
104 These included babassu and palm kernels and oils; hemp, kapok, and sunflower seeds and
their oils; etc.
1o The exemption of crude pine gum was limted to producers' sales by Amendment a to GCPR, 16
FED. REG. 1503 (I951).
""0Amendment 9 to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 2907 (1951), extended the exemption of American-
Egyptian cotton to include extra long staple cotton grown outside the United States.
zSR 17 to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 3159 (1g5i). Amendment x to SR 17, 17 FED. REG. 1393
(1952), extended the exemption to cover stumps as well as timber.108Sk 55 to GCPR, s6 FE. REG. 8893 (i95i). The exemption was finally made indefinite by
Revised SR 55, 17 FED. REG. 6416 (z952), for fear that an attempt to revert to GCPR base period prices
would create a chaotic condition.
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by a desire to avoid possible price impediments to the necessary supply of com-
modities which, while highly important in their uses, were quite unimportant in
the cost of living, business costs, or the costs of the defense program.'
Several factors led to an exemption for holiday fruit cake made primarily for
the Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday seasons." 0 The purchasing and pricing
practices for holiday fruit cake were different from those for other bakery products,
and the use of a winter base period freeze was inappropriate because most of the
purchasing and pricing took place in the late spring. Because of the imminence
of the holiday marketing season, OPS felt that any substantial delay to obtain data
necessary for tailored ceilings would be unjustified. On the other hand, OPS's un-
dermanned staff already was fully engaged in many more important projects. Since
holiday fruit cake was not important in the cost of living, it was decided to authorize
a temporary exemption, which would carry the industry through the holiday season,
pending the issuance of a tailored regulation for all bakery products.
Bonds, stocks, and other evidences of indebtedness were exempt from the GCPR,
as they had been by OPA under the GMPR. Sales of warehouse receipts, however,
were not considered sales of securities but rather sales of the commodities repre-
sented by the warehouse receipts."' OPA had adopted a similar position and court
decisions had supported its interpretation that sales of warehouse receipts were
nothing more than sales of the commodities themselves." 2 Money order charges
were also excluded from the exemption, being regarded as service charges for the
transmission and payment of money and the protection of funds rather than as
charges for the sale of an evidence of indebtedness "
3. Exemptions-Sales to or by Government Agencies."4 The GCPR listed among
its exemptions the following (in Section 14(r)):
Sales of military and strategic commodities but only to the extent specified by supple-
mentary regulations or orders which will be issued defining the scope of this exemption.
This provision was given content by Supplementary Regulation i to the GCPR," 5
containing exemptions from the GCPR which were considered necessary at that time
to insure that price controls did not interfere with the defense effort.
SR i, in Section 2, provided a temporary exemption until April i, 1951, for
sales of commodities and services normally produced and supplied only for military
use, to a defense agency or to any person for use in connection with a defense con-
0' Reagent chemicals, hog-cholera virus, and anti-hog cholera serum were exempted by GOR 3,
16 FED. REG. 3216 (i95i). Crude domestic botanical drugs were exempted by Amendment 3 to GOR 3,
16 FED. REo. 9478 (95).
... Amendment 18 to GCPR, x6 FED. REG. 8888 (951).
... Amendment 4 to GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 1949 (195), clarified the exemption so that it applied
to bonds, stocks, and other evidences of indebtedness representing monetary obligations only.
2 See, for example, Culhane v. Clark, 162 F. 2d 736 (E.C.A. 1947).
... See OPS MANUAL Pt. 2, c. 3, §2.35.
11. A detailed inalysis of problems relating to government purchases and sales is set forth in OPS
Activities Related to Government Purchases and Sales, by Worsley and Perkins, one of the series of
monographs on major problem areas of OPS experience.
11c x6 FED. REG. ioo6 (95).
516 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
tract or subcontract. "Defense Agency" was defined to mean the Department of
Defense, the Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, and the Atomic Energy
Commission."' This exemption was subsequently extended, first to deliveries under
a defense contract entered into prior to April I, 195I, or pursuant to a subcontract
thereunder entered into prior to May I, 1951,117 and later to deliveries under defense
contracts entered into prior to May i, 1951, or subcontracts thereunder entered into
prior to June I, 1951.118
Although the exemption under Section 2 was for a temporary period, most items
of a strictly military nature were specifically exempt without time limitation under
Section 5, on sales to a Defense Agency or to any person for use in connection with
a defense contract or subcontract. These exemptions included a list of military
weapons and related items such as ammunition. Section 5 also exempted without
time limitation a list of specific commodities when especially designed to meet
military needs, such as armored vehicles. In addition, a number of other defense
items were exempt, including ammunition boxes and aviation gasoline.
The temporary exemption under Section 2 was limited to items "normally pro-
duced and supplied only for military use." Thus, if an item was normally supplied
by any person for nonmilitary use, the exemption did not apply."' Nor was it
enough to show merely that the item was made to military specifications, or that
it differed in minor respects from any item made for nonmilitary use, In some
cases, military specifications called for products identical with or substantially the
same as civilian products. In those cases, the Section 2 exemption did not apply.12
0
For example, certain combat boots made to military specifications, which had no
civilian counterpart, were exempt. Other types of footwear which were closely akin
to civilian items, such as black oxfords, were not exempt, even though made to mili-
tary specifications.' 2 ' A similar approach was adopted in administering the in-
definite exemption under Section 5 of specified items "especially designed to meet
military needs."' 22
Although the temporary Section 2 exemption applied to an item to be used in a
subcontract under a defense contract, the subcontract product itself had to meet the
exemption test, "normally produced and supplied only for military use."128
Section 6 of SR i also exempted sales of specified services in connection with
a defense -contract or a subcontract. In addition, SR i exempted defense develop-
"'
8 The Office of Rubber Reserve, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, was included by Amendment
4, SR x, GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 2185 (1951), to allow applications for adjustments by sellers of soap
for use in the manufacture of synthetic rubber.
""
7 Amendment 2 to SR I, GCPR, 16 FED. REG. 1707 (z95i). By Amendment i, x6 FED. REo.
1234 (x951), sales of certain wool products were included in the temporary exemption for defense
contracts.
... Amendment 5, SR i, GCPR, z6 FED. REG. 3046 (ig5i).
a Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg 11:352a.5.
.2 Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg ii:352a.7 and 42 Reg 11:352a.io.
.2 GCPR; SR z, Interpretation 2, 16 FE.D. REG. 3113 (195); OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg
IX:352a.i.
22 Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg Ix:355b.I.
21 Interpretations, OPS Loose Leaf Service, 42 Reg II:352a.6.
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mental, emergency or secret contracts. The exemption for sales of commodities or
services pursuant to a developmental defense contract or subcontract applied only
when the appropriate defense agency certified to the Director of Price Stabilization
that the particular contract or subcontract was "developmental." A contract was
defined to be developmental during the period, not exceeding 6 months, required
by the defense contractor for the accumulation of sufficient production experience to
permit him to make a reasonably accurate estimate of his manufacturing costs.
A defense contract was also deemed developmental during the period, again not
exceeding 6 months, required by the purchaser under the defense contract for the
selection of a product. The Director of Price Stabilization reserved the right, after
consultation with the defense agency, to determine that the period necessary for
development had expired and to terminate the exemption.
The exemption for emergency defense contracts applied only when a defense
agency set forth the circumstances of emergency which made immediate delivery
imperative and which rendered it impossible to secure immediate delivery at the
ceiling price which would otherwise be applicable.
For obvious reasons, it was appropriate to exempt sales under a contract which
was officially classified as "secret" or above.
SR I also exempted sales of strategic and critical materials to the General Services
Administration pursuant to the strategic and critical materials stockpiling program.
This exemption was later extended and expanded as an exemption from all price
regulations. 24 In this form, it provided an unqualified exemption of strategic and
critical materials mined or produced outside the United States or its territories and
possessions, and sold to GSA under the Defense Production Act or the Strategic and
Critical Materials Stockpiling Act.1241 As to strategic and critical materials pro-
duced in the United States or its territories and possessions and so sold to GSA, the
exemption applied if the sale were pursuant to a contract entered into prior to Jan-
uary 25, i951, or, as to a contract executed after that date, if GSA filed a certification
that the marginal or submarginal character of the source or the necessity of additional
facilities or equipment made it uneconomic to produce the material at the ceiling
price otherwise applicable.
The exemptions in SR i for commodities and services sold to defense agencies
or under defense contracts followed in general the similar exemptions authorized
by OPA. These exemptions removed from the coverage of the GCPR a very
significant portion of expenditures by the military departments for commodities and
services, notwithstanding the fact that the cost of military procurement through
taxation and the federal budget was an important factor in the cost of living.
It has been noted earlier that both the Defense Production Act and the GCPR
defined "person" to include the Federal Government, so that purchases as well as
sales by the Federal Government were subject to the price control authority. In
fact, Section 401 of the Act (5o U. S. C. App. §2ioi (Supp. 1952)) specifically recited
"' Amendment i to GOR 2, i6 FED. REG. 6558 (I95i).
"'4 6o STAT. 596 (1946), as amended, 50 U. S. C. §98 (1946).
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that one of its purposes was to assure that defense appropriations were not dissipated
by excessive costs and prices.
It was the position of OPS that generally fair and equitable ceiling prices would
not impede the production or supply of commodities and services. It is under-
standable, however, that both the defense agencies and the stabilization agencies
would be less likely to remain adamant against allegations that ceilings were im-
peding production of strictly military and combat items than they would against
similar allegations respecting purely civilian items. Recognizing the importance
of stabilizing the cost of the defense program as well as the cost of living, and at
the same time recognizing the importance of avoiding price impediments to the
supply of essential military items, OPS sought to follow the general policy of setting
ceilings on the defense procurement items of an essentially civilian or commercial
nature, such as food and clothing, and exempting exclusively military end items and
their exclusively military components and parts.
SR i, issued only a few days after the GCPR itself, contained a list of exempted
commodities and services based on what was necessarily a very hasty review of the
range of military procurement. Many of the exempt items listed were clearly recog-
nizable as strictly combat items procured solely by defense agencies. In view of
the fact that this list was gotten together so quickly, it is not strange that doubt
might exist as to the necessity for the exemption of some of the listed items, such as
canteens or identification tags. Nevertheless, there was a natural tendency for items
originally exempt when sold on defense contracts to continue to be so exempt.
Especially in view of the increasing emphasis on decontrol in the later days of OPS,
it would have been contrary to the general stream of actions to attempt to reinstitute
price controls on items already exempt.
Thus, when a revised general overriding regulation was issued in 1952, bringing
together a number of provisions relating to purchases by federal agencies, at which
time SR i was revoked, the exemptions from the GCPR contained in SR i were in
general continued in the new regulation. 2 5
Some changes affecting these exemptions were made, however. Thus, the definition
of "Defense Agency" was expanded to include, in addition to agencies listed in SR
i, the Emergency Procurement Service of GSA, the Defense Materials Procure-
ment Agency, and any official agency of a foreign government.
SR i also exempted sales by the Atomic Energy Commission, sales of scrap, waste,
damaged or used materials by a defense agency, and sales by the Department of
Defense through its commissaries, exchanges, and stores.
These exemptions, like the others in SR i, were from the GCPR only. The com-
modities or transactions previously exempt under SR i became subject to price con-
trol, in the absence of further exemption, as other specific regulations were issued.
Thus, sales of iron and steel scrap by defense agencies were exempt so long as the
GCPR covered them, but they became subject to ceilings when a specific tailored
regulation was issued.' 2"
... GOR 2, Revision 1, 17 FED. REG. 6733 (952).
... CPR 5, Iron and Steel Scrap, x6 FED. REG. o6i (1951).
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Similarly, sales by Defense Department commissaries, exchanges, and stores were
exempt only to the extent that they were not brought under other specific ceiling
price regulations. However, sales by Defense Department commissaries and ex-
changes were exempted from all price regulations in 1953.127 Sales by the Veterans
Canteen Service, which maintained facilities in the hospitals and homes of the
Veterans Administration, were also exempt.
28
The freeze technique was not as appropriate for federal agencies as for com-
mercial or industrial concerns, and in particular it was not appropriate for sales of
used and surplus goods bought for use rather than resale. For these reasons, pend-
ing further study looking to a possible specific regulation for sales by federal agencies,
an exemption from the GCPR was authorized for sales of United States Government
property not acquired or produced for sale or stockpile and not covered by another
supplementary regulation or ceiling price regulation.129  Although originally in-
tended to be temporary, the exemption was eventually continued indefinitely 30
Like the general GCPR exemption for used items, the exemption was limited to
the GCPR, and was not applicable where a particular problem was already covered
by a specific regulation, nor was it applicable to resale by dealers.
It has been previously noted that in the last half of 1951, a large number of
sales of services by federal, state.or local governmental agencies were exempted from
price control.' 3 ' In 1952, certain types of sales of commodities by federal agencies
were also exempted. Included were:
I. Sales of commodities by a federal agency to other federal agencies for use and not
for resale. In these cases the Federal Government was both buyer and seller.
2. Sales by a federal agency to any foreign government or official agency thereof.
These transactions were often made in connection with the carrying out of the national
foreign policy, and price was usually a secondary factor.
3. Sales by a federal agency to a relief organization for export or donation. These
sales presented little or no inflationary dangers; price here also was usually secondary.13 2
Following the amendment to the Defense Production Act in 1952 prohibiting
ceilings on commodities and services supplied by state or local governments, sales
of commodities by these government units were exempted.3 3 The previous ex-
emption of services supplied by government agencies was continued. No over-all
exemption of commodities sold by the Federal Government was issued, however,
because federal agencies in some fields represented most important sources of supply,
as in the case of iron and steel scrap.
An earlier exemption applied to sales by the United States to federal agencies and
"" Amendment x to GOR iI, Revision 2, I8 FED. REG. 227 (1953).
"'
2 GOR ii, I6 FED. REG. 4618 (Ig5i).
.
2 SR 72 to GCPR, i6 FED. REG. 10159 (951).
... Extended by Amendment x, 17 FED. REG. 67 (1951), continued indefinitely by Amendment 2,
17 FED. REG. 1883 (1952). Revision x, 18 FED. REG. 626 (1953), made the exemption for federal
agencies somewhat broader than the general exemption from the GCPR for used supplies.
... Amendment 2, GOR 14, 16 FED. REG. 9563 (951).
152 GOR xi, Revision , 17 FED. RE. 6151 (1952).
"' Sec. 1o9(c), 66 STAT. 299 (1952); GOR ii, Revision 2, 17 FED. REG. 6702 (1952).
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by the District of Columbia to its own and federal agencies, of commodities pro-
duced and services supplied by their respective penal institutions. 84  These trans-
actions, in so far as the Federal Government was concerned, were largely covered
by the subsequent general exemption of sales of commodities by one federal agency
to another. Sales by District of Columbia agencies were included in the x952
general statutory exemption of sales by state and local governments.
D. Place of Exemptions in a General Freeze
The concept of a general freeze as an across-the-board ceiling on all prices, if
applied literally and rigidly, would rule out any provisions for exemptions. Yet,
the GMPR, issued by OPA in 1942, as well as the GCPR, issued by OPS in i95i ,
both popularly described as general freezes, were subject to significant exemptions
and exceptions.
Some of the exemptions, of course, were required by the mandatory terms of
the basic statutory authority to impose ceilings. Others, however, were the result
of the exercise of administrative discretion, under the general authority, contained
in both the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and the Defense Production Act
of i95o, to provide exemptions where necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes
of the legislationP'8 5
There would seem to be little question but that authority to make exemptions is
necessary and desirable in a continuing controls program, even under a general
freeze. Past experience under OPS and OPA confirms this, although it also points
up the fact that a too free and liberal legislative or administrative exemption policy
may impair the effectiveness of a direct controls program.
Undoubtedly, in any future full scale economic controls legislation, as contrasted
with temporary freeze action, Congress would see fit, as it has in the past, to specify
mandatory exemptions and to provide standards for discretionary exemptions.
At the same time, however, it must be recognized that there was a feeling that
a general freeze, to be most effective, should be as all encompassing and as in-
flexible as possible. This poses the dilemma which made price control administrators
envy tight-rope acrobats. If a general freeze, to be completely effective, is inflexible
and without exceptions, it may be too tight, creating inequities as well as obstacles
to essential defense production. On the other hand, if substantial exceptions are
made, the freeze becomes loose and ineffective.
A middle course between the horns of this dilemma would be to recognize that
some exemptions are necessary or desirable, but to hold these to a minimum in the
initial period of a general freeze whose purpose is to stop widespread movement of
prices. The major categories of initial exemptions from a general freeze might
be summarized as follows:
First, of course, would be the exemptions required by the basic legislative authority.
... GOR 19, x6 FED. REG. 1026o (1951).
.5 Sec. 2(c), Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 23 (942), as amended, 5o U. S. C.
App. §902(c) (1946); Scc. 4 02(f), Defense Production Act of 195o, 64 SrAT. 803, as amended, So
U. S. C. App. §2102(f) (Supp. 1952).
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Notwithstanding the view that exemptions impair the effectiveness of a general
freeze of prices, it is significant that both under OPA and OPS substantial exemp-
tions from price control were required by specific statutory provisions enacted by
Congress.
Second would be the areas where rigid application of a freeze might interfere
with military needs or the defense program. For example, both OPA and OPS fol-
lowed the practice of exempting strictly military items.
Third would be those commodities, services, or transactions, which would be
administratively most difficult to control, and which would not be important enough
to the costs of the defense program or to the cost of living to create serious difficulties
if left free from controls.
While a recitation of the items exempt from the GCPR seems long and to cover
a multitude of things, this is largely a result of the original decision to cover every-
thing not specifically included. If any attempt were made to list in the same detail
all the things covered by the freeze, the exemption list would be quickly reduced
to its true and relatively less important size.
